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Abstract 
As law enforcement agencies embrace technology, hot spots policing has enjoyed popularity. 
The esteem of the strategy is not without warrant, as many studies show its effectiveness. The 
policing strategy simply involves focusing police resources on a specific area or areas of 
concentrated crime. An abundance of policing tactics exists to address problems within these 
areas. Many studies tout significant crime reductions in hot spot areas, with some police 
treatments proving more effective than others. Other studies discuss trepidations regarding 
geographically focused police efforts. Therefore, law enforcement’s strategy in an area must 
involve careful consideration of the associated benefits and possible detriments of the focused 
policing efforts. This study provides a discussion and subsequent analysis of the use and 
effectiveness of saturation patrol in hot spots within Las Vegas, Nevada.  
 Keywords: hot spots policing, policing tactics, saturation patrol,  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
From January 1, 2016 through March 9, 2016, a homicide occurred every 49 hours in Las 
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department’s jurisdiction (Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
Department, 2016).  Comparing year-to-date statistics through March 5th for 2015 and 2016, 
LVMPD has experienced an increase in homicide, sexual assault, robbery, and assault and 
battery (Crosby, 2016). These increases led the Sheriff to rethink the department’s crime 
fighting strategy. The result was the creation of the violent crime initiative, which assigns 
specialized unit detectives to patrol the streets in high crime areas (Kim, 2016). This tactic is a 
short-term solution to Las Vegas’ crime problem and was met with a certain degree of 
skepticism from some of the officers (Kim, 2016). Going forward, a more strategic, well-
researched plan with positive findings is needed to combat violent crime. By researching 
different tactics, LVMPD can use this knowledge to implement the most promising response, 
while citing previous examples of its effectiveness. This paper will discuss previous literature on 
hot spots policing, and will analyze the methodological strengths and weaknesses of differing 
measures of crime. The research specifically addresses the use of saturation patrol as a hot 
spots policing technique and its effectiveness based on official police report data in comparison 
to calls for service data.  
From a practical standpoint, examining the effectiveness of policing strategies in crime 
hot spots is important due to its potential impact on overall crime within a community. 
Previous research has shown less than 5-percent of places comprise 50-percent of calls for 
service or crime incidents (Telep, Mitchell, & Weisburd, 2014). Policing these high-crime areas 
maximizes crime reduction benefits. If police focus on areas known to experience more 
 2 
 
frequent and severe crime problems, their resources may be allocated to have the greatest 
odds and impact on reducing overall crime rates, making the community a safer place. 
Correspondingly, researchers have noted, “(r)andom patrol across beats or precincts makes 
little sense if crime is highly concentrated in a very small number of locations in a city” 
(Weisburd, Hinkle, Famega, & Ready, 2011, p. 299). The practical implications of hot spots 
policing is supported by criminological theories.  
 Theoretically, the study of policing in crime hot spots, specifically with the use of 
saturation patrol, is significant in relation to deterrence, broken windows, and rational choice 
theories. First, directed patrol activity in these areas may have specific and general deterrent 
effects on criminals and potential criminals. As the saturation patrol stops, cites, and/or arrests 
subjects for violating laws within these areas, their enforcement may have a specific deterrent 
effect on the individual offenders, and a general deterrent effect on other potential offenders 
in the area who witness or otherwise learn about the infraction and consequent punishment. 
Second, according to Broken Windows hypothesis by Wilson and Kelling (1982), disorderly 
conduct leads to more serious crime. Therefore, a police focus on order maintenance (e.g. 
enforcement of minor offenses, such as public drunkenness and loitering) should be 
accompanied by a decrease in crime incidents. If this hypothesis holds true, directed patrol 
activity conducted by the saturation teams that focuses on restoring order in the areas through 
focusing on minor incivilities will cause a decrease in the amount of more serious offenses. 
Finally, the presence of the uniformed saturation patrol and their marked cars may alter 
criminals’ cost-benefit analysis due to increased risk of apprehension. Rational choice theory 
contends criminal activity will decrease as criminals perceive greater costs or risks than benefits 
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associated with crime. Ideally, a residual effect will remain and increase criminals’ sensed risk of 
detection even after the saturation team has left the area. For these theoretical and practical 
reasons, much previous research has been conducted on hot spots policing.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 In 2006, Weisburd, Wyckoff, Ready, Eck, Hinkle, and Gajewski conducted a study to 
examine the effectiveness of targeting hot spots using problem oriented policing methods, 
specifically on whether or not hot spots policing techniques resulted in a diffusion of crime 
from the targeted area to other, nearby areas which were not receiving the same levels of 
police attention. The researchers worked with a local police department in Jersey City, New 
Jersey and through collaborative efforts identified areas with high levels of criminal activity for 
their study based on analyzing calls-for-service crime mapping data, as well as direct 
obervations of potential areas. Twenty possible areas were whittled down to two final areas, 
one known to have a problem with drugs, and the other known to have a prostitution problem. 
By focusing on these income-generating types of crimes, the propensity of criminals to simply 
move to a different area would be greater due to their dependency on crime to earn a living. 
Social observations were used to determine the impacts of the police intervention in the 
targeted areas and the selected neighboring areas. Implementation strategies included 
removing prostitutes from the area, directly targeting known violent drug offenders in the area, 
altering landscapes to deter criminal activity,  and utilizing community groups to aid the 
prostitutes. Evidence from their research supported the spread of crime control benefits into 
nearby areas, rather than the displacement of crime. 
 Relying on social observations to determine any increase or decrease in criminal activity 
can be problematic. First, the mere presence of the observer may deter criminal activity, 
regardless of police activity. Second, criminal incidents are not always conducted in a setting 
which would be visible to an observer. Third, observers were only present in 20-minute 
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increments, so potential criminals only had to wait until the observers left to conduct their 
business. Finally, this method of measurement requires great time and expense, which may 
make it cost prohibitive for other police departments to utilize.  
 A study conducted by Braga and Bond in 2008 evaluated the effectiveness of policing 
crime and disorder hot spots in Lowell, Massachusetts. Hot spots were identified by examining 
areas with “consistently high levels of citizen crime and disorder calls for service over time” 
(Braga & Bond, 2008, p. 583). Their study, like Weisburd et al.’s 2006 study, utilized problem 
oriented policing (POP) methods within the hot spots. However, this study comprised of 34 
total areas, and through random assignment half served as controls and the other half received 
treatment. The experiment ran for one year. Throughout this time police captains were 
responsible for the implementation of the problem oriented policing strategies in their 
respective areas, and were required to report on the areas monthly, ensuring compliance with 
the experiment. 
 To analyze the impact of police interventions in the hot spots, researchers relied on 
both calls for service data and collected data on “physical and social incivilities” using 
observation techniques (Braga & Bond, 2008, p. 586). This data was collected for a period of six 
months before and after the policing initiatives started and concluded. Observed physical 
disorder included “abandoned buildings, vacant lots, trash, graffiti, abandoned cars, and other 
physical incivilities” (Braga & Bond, 2008, p. 587). Social disorder included subjects loitering and 
or drinking in public. The researchers conducting the field observations were unaware which 
areas were control and which received treatment. Researchers were only in the area for five 
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minutes for each period of observation, and were escorted by an officer in plainclothes in an 
unmarked car.  
 By comparing the six month post-intervention period to the six month pre-intervention 
period, researchers showed a significant decrease in calls for service and disorder obsesrvations 
in areas receiving problem oriented policing with no notable displacement of crime to nearby 
areas. However, they note the techniques utilized by officers more closely resembled a general 
disorder policing strategy than a problem oriented strategy (Braga & Bond, 2008). This was due 
to a shallow, surface-level analysis and solution of the problems within the areas, rather than a 
more well thought out, longer-term solution to the crime problems.  
 Taylor, Koper, and Woods (2010) implemented a study of hot spots policing in 
Jacksonville, Florida. Their research design included 83 violent crime hot spots. Through 
random assignment, 40 served as controls, 21 received directed saturation patrol, and 22 
received problem oriented policing tactics for a 90-day period. The police saturation technique 
worked to “create a heightened police presence in specific locations” (p. 157) with these areas 
averaging around 53 hours of officer presence per week (Taylor, Koper, & Woods, 2011). The 
problem oriented policing initiatives included social services and situational crime prevention 
techniques, similar to Braga and Bond’s (2010) study in Lowell, MA. Officers implementing POP 
averaged 95 hours in their respective areas. Researchers analyzed crime report data, calls for 
service data, arrest data, and field interview data for the one-year period before, and for the 
90-days during and after the experiment.  
Findings showed “the use of POP was associated with a 33% reduction in ‘street 
violence’ during the 90 days following the intervention” (Taylor, Koper, & Woods, 2011, p. 149). 
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However, the findings for police saturation did not rise to levels of statistical significance. This 
experiment could have benefitted from a longer experimentation period, as researchers noted 
short-term interventions experience “greater likelihood that effects will decay quickly after the 
intervention ends” (Taylor, Koper, & Woods, 2011, p. 156). However, using multiple sources of 
official police data lends to more robust analysis than relying on one measure alone.  
Shortcomings regarding the use of just one crime measure are evident in the Las Vegas 
Smart Policing Initiative, a study that examined the use of saturation patrol in crime hot spots in 
Las Vegas in 2012.  The findings failed to find a significant difference between the treatment 
groups and control groups, or those not receiving the attention of the local police department’s 
Saturation Team (Baldwin, et al., 2014). The researchers offer the limitations of calls for service 
data, which was their primary official data source, as a possible explanation for their findings. 
However, the study also included a survey in the area and found citizens in the treatment areas 
had higher perceptions of police presence. These findings indicate possible support of a crime 
deterrent effect, and could also explain increased calls for service in treatment areas if citizens 
feel more willing to report criminal activity due to the increased presence of police.   
Jang, Lee, and Hoover (2012) also studied the efficacy of police saturation within hot 
spots. Their experiment specifically aimed to measure the effectiveness of Dallas’ “Disruption 
Unit” on hot spots, which operated on a rotating and therefore inconsistent basis. The study 
measured three tactics utilized by the Disruption Unit, namely person and vehicle stops, 
citations, and arrests. Results from their study indicated the rotating saturation technique 
immediately worked to reduce violent and nuisance offenses. Further, stops were the only 
technique proven to significantly reduce these types of offenses. No other types of crime or 
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tactics showed significant reductions. The researchers also noted a lack of findings in support of 
a residual effect of the hot spots policing utilized. In their study, the reduction in violent crime 
and nuisance offenses due to the police saturation conducting stops deteriorated within less 
than one week of the units leaving the area. 
 In a more recent experiment, Groff, Ratcliff, Haberman, Sorg, Joyce, and Taylor (2015) 
studied different hot spots policing techniques in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 81 violent crime 
hot spots were identified and selected for the experiment, which were equally and randomly 
designated to either receive foot patrol, problem oriented policing, offender-focused policing, 
or serve as a control. The treatments were in effect for 12 to 24 weeks, and the large number of 
areas accompanied by random assignment of treatment type serve as methodological strengths 
of the study.  
When examining official police data, Groff et al.’s findings showed strong crime 
reduction benefits in areas utilizing offender-focused policing techniques. Areas utilizing 
problem oriented policing and foot patrol failed to show statistically significant crime reduction 
results. Additionally, evidence supported a diffusion of crime control benefits rather than crime 
displacement (Groff, et al., 2015).  
Hot spots policing, no matter the tactic utilized, is not without its criticism. In their 
article, Weisburd, Hinkle, Famega, and Ready (2011) test three possible negative effects of hot 
spots policing after areas received problem oriented structured treatment. The study measured 
impacts on fear – did the increased police presence cause citizens to fear their environment, 
collective efficacy – did the increased police presence erode networks of informal social 
controls in the areas, and police legitimacy – did the police presence help or hinder relations 
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with citizens in the areas? They state “police must reduce fear and increase collective efficacy 
and legitimacy in affected areas if they are to have long-term effects on crime” (Weisburd, 
Hinkle, Famega, & Ready, 2011, p. 298). Their findings revealed no statistically significant 
findings supporting the three potential “backfire” effects. Although no evidence of these 
backfire effects was found, police must still be cautious of the potential unintended 
consequences of hot spots policing on the community.  
In summary, hot spots policing has proven effective at reducing crimes. Some research 
supports the use of POP as an effective technique (Braga & Bond, 2008, Taylor, Koper, & 
Woods, 2011), while other research points to a offender-focused policing over POP in terms of 
effectively reducing violent crime (Groff, et al., 2015). Notable to the current study, Taylor, 
Koper, and Woods (2011) and Baldwin et al. (2014) did not show significant results with 
saturation, but Jang, Lee, and Hoover (2012) did see significant reductions for certain types of 
crimes while examining effects of police saturation. Regarding displacement, the overall 
research supports a diffusion of crime control benefits, rather than a displacement of crime into 
neighboring areas (Weisburd, et al., 2006, Braga & Bond, 2008, Groff, et al., 2015). However, 
researchers should also question which measurement of crime is most effective at determining 
the success of the differing policing tactics utilized within crime hot spots.  
The various measures of crime all have strengths and limitations, which are important to 
consider when conducting research. Crime can be measured by victimization surveys, 
UCR/crime report data, arrest statistics, calls for service, and observations. The deficiencies of 
one measure may be overcome by utilizing another measure. As such, the present thesis will 
draw on strengths and weaknesses of previous hot spot policing research and specifically 
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reanalyze a previous study using a different measure of crime to determine any possible 
dissimilarities in findings.  
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Chapter 3: Current Study 
This paper will discuss the effectiveness of directed patrol activity in areas with current 
and historic crime problems. Areas determined to have crime problems are referred to as hot 
spots. This determination is made based on higher incidence and regularity of crime, causing 
these areas to represent relatively high concentrations of crime. Deployment and efforts of 
saturation patrol, the independent variable, are expected to cause a decrease in the levels of 
crime report data, the dependent variable. Defined hot spots of crime, as determined by area 
commanders through historic data and previous experience, comprise the unit of analysis for 
the study. This study will build off the Las Vegas Smart Policing Initiative, a study that analyzed 
the impact of police saturation on crime within hot spots using calls for service data (Baldwin, 
et al., 2014). However, this study will analyze the impact of police saturation using official crime 
report data, as opposed to calls for service data.  Utilizing a different measure of crime may 
highlight differences between the two, particularly possible limitations or strengths of both 
crime measures. 
Research Question 1: Is there a difference between treatment and control groups in the 
 Las Vegas Smart Policing Initiative? 
Research Question 2: Is there a difference between measurements of crime, specifically 
 calls for service and crime report data? 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
Sampling Plan 
 The actual population of the present thesis is all possible crime hot spots within Las 
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department’s jurisdiction. The sampling frame is synonymous with 
the actual population, which serves to significantly lessen sampling error and bias, resulting in 
findings that will be generalizable to the actual population.  
The hot spots used in Baldwin et al.’s study were identified with the assistance of patrol 
captains presiding over each of the eight area commands in the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
Department1. Each captain identified three hot spots in their area commands, based on their 
prior experience and knowledge of the areas, to create a purposive sample of 24 hot spots. As 
David Weisburd (2003) contends, “separation of academic criminology and criminal justice from 
crime and justice practice has hindered the development of experimental research” (p. 346). In 
order to help overcome barriers, it is within the best interests of researchers to involve 
practitioners in the process and receive their input. Allowing the captains to provide input and 
develop the purposive sample is not only beneficial to maintain good, working relationships, 
but the leaders typically are very familiar with the nuances present in their respective areas. 
Their years of experience and training while working the streets is an invaluable resource to the 
study of the police profession and its impact on crime. It behooves researchers to consult and 
involve those in practice. However, there are some inherent limitations with the utilized 
sampling plan.  
                                                          
1 As of March 2017, there are nine area commands within LVMPD’s jurisdiction. However, at the time of the 
experiment in 2012, there were only eight area commands. 
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Sampling Plan Considerations 
First, the sampling frame may be limited by allowing patrol captains to use discretion to 
identify target areas. Captains may have felt pressure to produce favorable results from the 
experiment, and may have attempted to influence selection such that less problematic areas 
were chosen. By not addressing a particularly problematic area, the patrol captain would have 
an easier time showing positive results.  
 Second, by including three hot spots from each area command, other high crime areas 
may be excluded from the study. While each area command is representing equally by 
identified hot spots, crime is not equally distributed throughout the Las Vegas valley. It is 
possible that one area command may have five viable hot spots, but is limited to select only 
three. Conversely, an area command with less crime may identify three hot spots whose crime 
problems do not rise to the same level as the other twenty-one areas. Proportionate sampling 
could have been used to combat this issue and ensure areas with more crime are more fairly 
represented. However, the efforts made to sort the areas by amount of calls for service events 
and match them, discussed further in the following section, ensures fair representation of 
similar crime hot spot areas in both the control and treatment settings. Additionally, including 
the same number of areas from each area command ensures equal buy-in from the 
commanders and allows correlations to be made about the valley as a whole, and not just 
certain regions. The buy-in of the commanders is important to ensure the experiment is well-
received and conducted in a favorable setting. Furthermore, representing regions of the valley 
equally allows any findings to be generalized to the population, all crime hot spots in the Las 
Vegas valley. 
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 Finally, while the sampling frame matches the actual population, generalizability cannot 
be assumed outside of this location. Las Vegas is a very unique city, known to cater to adult 
vices. The problems faced by this city may not reflect situations in other areas. For instance, if 
the iconic Las Vegas Strip comprises a hot spot due to a high level of prostitution-related 
robberies, the findings from this experiment may widely vary from a city whose major crime 
problem is drunk driving. Furthermore, state laws allow open-carry of weapons in Las Vegas, 
which may lead to high rates of weapon related calls for service. The nuances presented by this 
characteristic will likely be vastly different from a Northeast town with very strict gun control 
laws. Limited resources of time and money prevented the development of a sample more 
representative of a broader population. Despite the listed limitations, the outlined sampling 
plan as well as the research design and measurement of the study ensure high levels of internal 
validity, which compensates for the potential lack of generalizability outside the study area.  
Measurement 
 The dependent variable, crime, will be measured in terms of incidence of crime reports 
within each respective area. Since police officers take reports in events that do not constitute 
crimes, such as missing persons, lost/found property, sick/injured person, etc., only certain 
crime reports will be included in the measure. Analysis will include data on what will be 
referred to as “Compstat” crimes and “Non-ACTION” crimes2. Compstat crimes consist of 
                                                          
2 When entering a crime report in LVMPD’s records management system, the report is assigned a crime category, 
based on the statute the officer selects for the report. The Non-ACTION crime category is the catch-all for all 
events not meeting the specifications to fall into one of the Compstat categories. During the process of coding, 
Non-ACTION crimes were excluded from current research if they did not represent a crime (missing person, 
runaway juvenile, sick/injured person, dead body, etc.). Additionally, crimes falling into this category that 
represented domestic situations were excluded, since these events largely take place within the home and 
theoretically would not be deterred by the presence of the Saturation Team in the area. The top five most 
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homicide, sexual assault, robbery, assault or battery with a deadly weapon, burglary, auto 
burglary, and auto theft. These crimes were largely selected to resemble Uniform Crime 
Reports (UCR) Part I offenses. Non-ACTION crimes consist of a wide breadth of other types of 
crime, and were designed to include larceny events, crimes closely associated with disorder, 
and to capture crimes that resembled the Compstat crimes, but did not rise to the same level of 
severity. As with UCR, only the highest charge for each event is included. By utilizing this crime 
measure, results from the analyses to follow can be compared to the results in the Baldwin et 
al. (2014) study, to identify possible differences between calls for service and crime report data.  
While both official measures of crime, calls for service and crime report data both have 
unique considerations. Calls for service data includes all calls from citizens received by police 
dispatch. This type of data is thought to be beneficial, as it is free of any police bias. However, 
with calls for service it is important to “weed out multiple calls regarding the same incident” 
(Klinger & Bridges, 1997, p. 706). For example, if multiple citizens in an area call 911 to report 
hearing gunshots, these calls would each register as a separate call for service. Identifying and 
removing these types of duplicate calls can be done by identifying similar crimes across similar 
times and areas. However, this process may be problematic. It is possible separate events could 
have occurred within the same area around the same time, and assuming the two are related 
to the same call would misrepresent the data. Further, identifying duplicate calls for the same 
incident may not be a simple task. An illegal shooting could be reported around 2:00am, but it 
could take another citizen several hours from the shooting to realize their home was struck by 
                                                          
numerous crime types that remain for study within the Non-ACTION category include grand/petit larceny, battery, 
injure or destroy property of another, trespass, and tampering/injuring a vehicle.   
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gunfire and call to report the event. To identify these crimes as duplicates would take an 
analyst reviewing the events, reading the dispatch notes, and making the determination that 
the two are indeed related. Again, a chance exists these two incidents were not related, which 
would result in measurement error. Additionally, callers may not accurately describe the type 
of crime they are reporting. Keeping with the previous example of a citizen reporting hearing 
gunshots, the actual noise may have been due to fireworks or a vehicle backfiring. In this and 
similar cases, it would be important for the officer and dispatcher to work together to identify 
the correct crime and change the classification in the dispatch system. 
 Crime report data is not without its shortcomings, but it does combat some of the 
negative elements of utilizing calls for service data. One of the biggest advantages of crime 
report data over calls for service data lies in the fact that not every crime is called into police 
dispatch by a citizen. Police officers encounter a number of crimes in their daily work in 
addition to dispatched crimes. Previous research indicates as much as 30% of crimes responded 
to are in addition to dispatched calls (Klinger & Bridges, 1997). Capturing these crimes is 
important to give a truer picture of crime, and not simply presenting crime that has been called 
in by a citizen. Furthermore, officers utilize their training and experience when creating crime 
reports to properly classify the crimes and minimize the duplication of the same events. If an 
officer responds to an area after reports of an illegal shooting, there may be multiple calls-for-
service related to the event, but the officer will likely only generate one crime report based on 
evidence found at the scene. Therefore, the count of this crime report would be a more 
accurate depiction of the crime, especially compounded with the actual evidence found to 
support the occurrence of a criminal event. Conducting the analyses in this thesis with crime 
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report data may present a more accurate depiction of the results of the Las Vegas Smart 
Policing Initiative.  
Research Design 
 A pre-test - post-test control group randomized experimental design will be utilized in 
the study. Specifically, crime report data for Compstat and Non-ACTION crimes, for the two-
month period preceding LVMPD’s Saturation Team enforcement or control will be compared to 
the two-month period after the enforcement or control. To include a more robust analysis, 
crime report data for Compstat and Non-ACTION crimes during the two-month experimental 
period will also be examined relative to the pre-test and post-test results. The results from the 
experimental areas will be compared to those of the control areas to identify possible 
differences in the dependent variable due to the intervention.  
 The Saturation Team consisted of 2 sergeants and 24 officers during the experimental 
period (March-October 2012). Due to the finite police resources, the Saturation Team only 
patrolled three areas at a time, therefore the experimental period consisted of four two-month 
waves to cover each of the twelve areas selected for treatment. To ensure optimal design, the 
areas were randomly assigned to determine whether or not they represented treatment or 
control groups.  
 Ensuring equivalence between the treatment and control groups through random 
assignment is key to an internally valid experimental design. After the sample of 24 hot spots 
was created, it was sorted in descending order based on the volume of calls for service events 
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in 20113, the year preceding the experimental period. The areas were paired off in twos, 
starting with the first two areas on the sorted list and so on until obtaining 12 pairs of 2 areas. 
One of the areas was then randomly selected, based on a coin toss, to serve as a control 
(operating under routine settings), and the remaining area received the treatment of the 
Saturation Team. The matching technique ensured both treatment and control groups contain 
areas with similar levels of calls for service, whether comparatively high, medium, or low. This 
aided in the equivalence of both groups, and decreased the possibility of selection bias. 
 
Figure 1. Geographic Distribution of Treatment and Control Areas 
 
          Treatment Area 
          Control Area 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 See Appendix for 2011 calls for service totals. 
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 The pre-test – post-test control group design safeguards the experiment from 
confounding effects and threats to internal validity. Each area, whether receiving treatment or 
control, will be subject to pre-testing through an examination of crime report statistics prior to 
their respective wave start date. Two months of official crime report data was compiled, with 
the help of LVMPD, to represent the pre-test data for each area. A two-month period will also 
be used to compile the same data for the posttest at the conclusion of the experimental period. 
By using the pre-test – post-test control group design, sufficient checks are in place to control 
for extraneous variables. Specifically, effects of testing, maturation, and instrumentation will be 
felt by both control and treatment groups, so any differences between the groups is more likely 
due to the introduction of the independent variable rather than those extraneous variables.  
 Due to limited resources, the deployment of the Saturation Team, the independent 
variable, was conducted in four waves, each covering a period of two-months4. Six areas were 
assigned to each wave, three control and three treatment. The control groups operated as 
usual and did not receive the efforts of the Saturation Team. The treatment groups received the 
Saturation Team enforcement. Table 1 depicts the areas and their corresponding wave 
assignment and experimental designation. To address possible confounding temporal 
differences due to the various timing of the waves, analyses will include testing of the areas 
within each separate wave. 
  
                                                          
4 Wave 1: March 1, 2012 – April 30, 2012 
Wave 2: May 1, 2012 – June 30, 2012 
Wave 3: July 1, 2012 – August 31, 2012 
Wave 4: September 1, 2012 – October 31, 2012 
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Table 1. Hot Spot Areas, Wave Assignment, and Treatment or Control Group Designation 
Area No. 
Wave 
Assignment 
Treatment (1) 
or Control (0) 
3 1 0 
8 1 1 
7 1 0 
20 1 1 
13 1 0 
21 1 1 
16 2 0 
5 2 1 
18 2 0 
4 2 1 
12 2 0 
17 2 1 
10 3 1 
22 3 0 
11 3 1 
6 3 0 
1 3 0 
15 3 1 
2 4 1 
9 4 0 
23 4 1 
19 4 0 
14 4 0 
24 4 1 
 
Saturation Team Deployment 
As Baldwin et al. (2014) note, the Saturation Team spent an equal amount of time in the 
three experimental areas during each two-month wave. During this time, the Saturation Team, 
some with uniforms and using marked cars and some without uniforms (CNA, 2010), patrolled 
the areas while exempt from answering or responding to calls for service. This freed the officers 
to patrol the areas in proactive ways. When an infraction was identified, the officers, at times 
with the help of the sergeants, used their discretion to determine the disposition of the 
offense. That is, order maintenance, such as simply stopping a subject for loitering, does not 
require the issuance of a citation or arrest, as seen with zero-tolerance methods (Sousa, 2010). 
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By still drawing attention to these infractions, without necessarily imposing an official sanction, 
the certainty and swiftness of punishment works to deter would-be offenders, while the 
severity is not so extreme that it serves a detrimental effect. As Stafford and Warr’s 
reconceptualized deterrence theory contends, the avoidance of punishment may do “more to 
encourage crime than punishment does to discourage it” (Stafford & Warr, 2014, p. 433). The 
presence of the officers increases the likelihood of identifying criminal conduct, thereby 
lessening the encouraging effects of punishment avoidance and conversely increasing the 
probability of punishment, even if that punishment is simply a warning from the officers. 
Further, Stafford and Warr also contend that deterrence operates across crimes in general, and 
is not limited to any specific crime. According to their theory, a subject stopped for a 
misdemeanor drug offense will be deterred from other crimes as well, not just the crime for 
which the subject was stopped. 
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Chapter 5: Data Analysis 
Data  
The data utilized within this study will consist of secondary data, specifically counts of 
official crime reports for Compstat and Non-ACTION crimes taken by LVMPD within each 
respective hot spot during the pre-test through the post-test. Analysts at LVMPD compiled the 
data using their records management systems and geographic information systems and 
provided the data for research purposes. The data include counts for each category of crime in 
each respective area by week from January 1, 2012 through December 29, 2012. As with the 
Baldwin et al. (2014) report, the data was standardized to ensure equivalence between the 
waves, since the weekly data does not correspond exactly to the wave time periods, and the 
weekly time periods do not have an equal number of days. The wave periods were broken 
down into the following weeks for data collation: 
Wave 1: March 4, 2012 – April 28, 2012 
Wave 2: April 29, 2012 – June 30, 2012 
Wave 3: July 1, 2012 – September 1, 2012 
Wave 4: September 2, 2012 – October 27, 2012 
 These selected time periods most closely coordinated with the timing of the wave 
implementation. The selected weekly periods represented 56, 63, 63, and 56 days, respectively. 
As such, it was necessary to standardize the data to ensure equivalence. The total crime counts 
by week for each area were standardized using the multipliers 61/56, 61/63, 61/63, 61/56. The 
numerator value, 61, is utilized to represent the two-month periods of the wave deployments. 
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Waves 1, 2, and 4 each ran for 61 days. Wave 3 ran for 62 days, however the differences of 1 
day out of 245 total days is not expected to materially impact results.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Select Crime Report Data from January 1, 2012 – December 
29, 2012 
Crime Type Incidents 
% of 
subcategory % of total 
        Homicide 19 2% 
  
        Sexual Assault 140 16% 
        Robbery 366 42% 
        A/B WDW 337 39% 
   VIOLENT CRIME 862 25% 12% 
        Burglary 1442 55% 
  
        Auto Burglary 458 17% 
        Auto Theft 720 27% 
   PROPERTY CRIME 2620 75% 37% 
COMPSTAT CRIMES 3482 49% 
NON-ACTION CRIMES 3565 51% 
TOTAL CRIMES 7047   
 
 Compstat and Non-ACTION crimes totaled 7,047 throughout January 1, 2012 – 
December 29, 2012, as seen in Table 2. Of this figure, Compstat crimes comprised 3,482 (49%) 
and Non-ACTION crimes made up the remaining 3,565 (51%). The breakdown of Compstat 
crimes between violent (homicide, sexual assault, assault/battery with a deadly weapon, 
robbery) and property (auto theft, auto burglary, burglary) reveals violent crimes accounted for 
25% of this category of crime, and property crimes accounted for 75%. Of the Compstat crimes, 
burglary was the most common, accounting for 41%. The more frequent occurrence of property 
crimes is a familiar phenomenon when studying crime (Federal Bureau of Investigation). When 
comparing to all categories of crime, property crime comprised 37%, violent crime 12% and 
Non-ACTION crime 51%. Due to the various crimes represented within the Non-ACTION crime 
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category, these types of crimes were not further broken down into property and violent 
offenses. Throughout 2012, all hot spots areas had a mean of 5.7 Compstat and Non-ACTION 
crimes per week, based on crime report data. Of the 84 homicides that occurred in 2012 (Las 
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 2013), 19, or 23% occurred within the boundaries of 
the selected hot spots. The hot spot areas only comprise 3% of the total square mileage of the 
eight area commands combined, showing a notable overrepresentation of homicides in 2012 
occurring within the hot spot areas. This effectively illustrates a concentration of crime and 
violence within the hot spots selected for the study. 
Statistical Analyses 
 The statistical analyses conducted will include independent samples t-tests. The 
analyses are divided into three distinct parts. Part 1 includes comparisons of means between 
treatment and control group for the weeks the Saturation Team was present and the weeks the 
Saturation Team was not present. Part 2 includes similar analyses as Part 1, but introduces a 
control for square mileage. Part 3 analyses consist of within group comparisons. That is, these 
analyses compare group data from one time period to the next, rather than comparing across 
treatment and control groups. Broken Windows and Rational Choice Theory support the 
hypothesis that the policing efforts of the saturation team within the hot spot areas will cause a 
decrease in the amount of Compstat and Non-ACTION crimes relative to the control areas.  
 The results of the statistical analyses based on the crime report data will then be 
compared to the results of similar tests from the Baldwin et al. (2014) study, which used calls 
for service data. The comparisons will help identify any possible differences between the test 
results and will highlight the differences between the crime measures. This methodological 
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study is important to notate the benefits and shortcomings of both official crime report and 
calls for service data.  
Analysis of Crime Report Data 
Part 1: Treatment and Control Group Comparisons 
 To provide a general overview, mean differences for the experimental and control 
groups were compared. Table 3 shows the results for mean total crime reports for the entire 
36-week experimental period. No significant differences are apparent for the crime types 
examined. 
 
Table 3. Mean Crime During 36-week Experimental Period 
Crime type Experimental Control t-value 
Violent 8.53 7.92 0.77 
Property 23.47 24.94 -0.99 
Non-ACTION 31.67 36.00 -1.64 
Overall 63.67 68.86 -0.97 
 
Next, means for each area’s respective pre-test, experimental and post-test periods 
were compared based on treatment and control assignment. As mentioned previously, these 
figures were standardized to reflect a 61-day period.  
 
Table 4. Mean Crime in Experimental and Control Areas 
  
Experimental 
Area Mean 
Control 
Area Mean t-value 
Pre-test 48.03 47.77 0.05 
Experimental Period 47.46 52.67 -0.93 
Post-test 48.52 53.19 -0.76 
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Overall, there were no significant differences between the experimental and control 
areas throughout the pre-test, experimental, or post-test periods. Table 5 shows similar, 
nonsignificant differences between the treatment and control areas throughout the respective 
periods when crime was categorized into violent, property, and non-ACTION offenses. 
 
Table 5. Mean Crime in Experimental and Control Areas by Crime Category 
  
Experimental 
Area Mean 
Control 
Area Mean t-value 
Pre-test 
       Violent 7.47 6.27 0.87 
       Property 15.85 16.17 -0.16 
       Non-ACTION 24.71 25.33 -0.16 
Experimental Period 
       Violent 6.43 5.74 0.65 
       Property 18.02 20.49 -1.09 
       Non-ACTION 23.01 26.44 -0.91 
Posttest 
       Violent 6.32 6.75 -0.33 
       Property 19.95 17.97 0.83 
       Non-ACTION 22.25 28.47 -1.49 
 
 The differing dates of the waves present a possible confounding variable. For instance, 
Waves 2 and 3 ran from May through June and July through August, respectively. Certain crime 
rates tend to fluctuate seasonally. For instance, research has shown burglary, certain larceny 
events, aggravated assaults, sexual assaults, and rape increase in the summer months (Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, 2014), possibly due to children being out of school, weather being warmer, 
and longer periods of daylight. The temporal differences between the wave implementations 
could impact the results of the analyses. As such, analyses were also run after separating the 
areas into waves.  
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As Table 6 illustrates Waves 1 and 2 saw the only significant differences between the 
treatment and control areas. During Wave 2, mean crime reports in the treatment areas were 
significantly less than that of the control areas throughout the experimental and post-test 
periods. During the pre-test, the treatment and control groups in Wave 2 were not significantly 
different.  This result is aligned with what LVMPD hoped to see when dispatching the Saturation 
Team to the hot spot areas. The presence of the officers during the wave possibly had a crime 
deterrent effect. Waves 3 and 4 also saw their respective treatment areas experience less crime 
than the control areas in the experimental and post-test periods versus the pre-test period, 
albeit at amounts that failed to reach levels of statistical significance. However, Wave 1 
treatment areas had significantly more crime than the control areas. 
Table 6 shows Wave 1 treatment areas experienced significantly more crime throughout 
all three time periods. The statistical differences were sustained throughout pre-test, 
experimental, and post-test periods, which fails to show an effect either way for the use of 
saturation patrol during this wave implementation. However, throughout the other three 
waves, the treatment areas experienced less crime than, or no remarkable difference from the 
control areas. Again, the t-tests revealed significantly less crime in Wave 2, but the tests failed 
to reach levels of statistical significance for Waves 3 and 4.  
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Table 6. Mean Weekly Crime by Wave Assignment  
                                        
  PRE-TEST EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD POST-TEST    
      Treatment 
mean 
  Control 
mean 
      Treatment 
mean 
  Control 
mean 
      Treatment 
mean 
  Control 
mean 
    
   Wave Area Area t-value  Wave Area Area t-value  Wave Area Area t-value   
  1 8 6.56 3 3.34   1 8 9.53 3 5.85   1 8 9.36 3 6.46     
    20 7.21 7 5.70     20 8.58 7 5.58     20 6.67 7 5.59     
    21 3.98 13 3.23     21 5.85 13 2.86     21 5.06 13 3.01     
    SUM 17.75 SUM 12.26 2.61**   SUM 23.96 SUM 14.30 4.14**   SUM 21.09 SUM 15.06 2.41**   
  2 5 12.66 16 20.56   2 5 12.37 16 19.26   2 5 13.45 16 21.41     
    4 6.94 18 7.35     4 4.52 18 5.27     4 4.84 18 6.46     
    17 2.45 12 3.68     17 1.51 12 3.98     17 1.94 12 4.09     
    SUM 22.06 SUM 31.59 -1.67   SUM 18.40 SUM 28.51 4.45**   SUM 20.23 SUM 31.95 -4.03**   
  3 10 3.98 22 7.10   3 10 3.12 22 7.32   3 10 4.08 22 8.17     
    11 8.71 6 4.52     11 7.21 6 7.10     11 8.17 6 6.81     
    15 4.09 1 2.69     15 4.30 1 3.34     15 4.49 1 2.72     
    SUM 16.78 SUM 14.31 1.11   SUM 14.63 SUM 17.75 -1.59   SUM 16.75 SUM 17.70 0.40   
  4 2 5.81 9 5.59   4 2 6.94 9 7.76   4 2 5.92 9 5.49     
    23 3.98 19 2.58     23 2.72 19 3.68     23 2.37 19 2.04     
    24 0.11 14 0.86     24 0.41 14 1.23     24 0.22 14 0.65     
    SUM 9.90 SUM 9.04 0.39   SUM 10.08 SUM 12.66 -1.45   SUM 8.50 SUM 8.18 0.20   
  *<.10, **<.05                                 
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These findings far from offer conclusive determinations as to the effectiveness of the 
Saturation Team within these hot spots. The decreased crime in Wave 2 areas during the 
experimental period and post-test shows promise for the policing tactic, but the other waves 
did not see similar results. It is possible the temporal differences between the waves confound 
the findings. The continued significant decrease in crime in the post-test period for is 
encouraging. This would support the belief that the Saturation Team is capable of creating a 
lasting deterrent impact beyond their deployment. However, without additional findings that 
suggest this result, support for saturation patrol and its immediate and long-term effects is 
inadequate. 
During the pre-test, experimental, and post-test periods, Wave 1 saw significantly higher 
crime in the treatment areas than the control areas. This finding is not congruent with the 
belief that the Saturation Team’s deployment would deter crime. As the original researchers in 
the Las Vegas Smart Policing Initiative note, a decay effect is possible after the Saturation Team 
leaves a hot spot (CNA, 2010). If this result is evidence of a decay effect, it is weakened by the 
lack of similar findings throughout the post-test period of the remaining three waves.  Again, 
failure to see similar findings during the other three waves highlights the likelihood that 
temporal differences are possibly attributable to the differing results. 
In order to separate the impacts of the Saturation Team on the various types of crime, 
analyses were also conducted to review the levels of violent, property, and non-ACTION crimes 
by wave during the experimental and post-test periods. Table 7 shows the results of the 
analyses. Notably, during the experimental period in Wave 1 each category of crime was 
significantly higher in the treatment areas. Wave 2 saw an opposite trend for property and non-
 30 
 
ACTION crimes, with these categories significantly lower in the treatment areas during the 
experimental period. Continuing into the post-test, the treatment areas’ higher crime incidents 
were still apparent for Wave 1’s property and non-ACTION crimes. Similarly, Wave 2’s non-
ACTION crimes remained significantly lower in the treatment areas. These findings match those 
in Table 6, which shows higher crime in Wave 1 treatment areas, and lower crime in Wave 2 
treatment areas. All other waves failed to reach levels of statistical significance. Further, there 
were no material differences between the groups during the pre-test period. Due to the lack of 
differences before the experiment, it is possible enforcement of the Saturation Team produced 
the significant differences in the experimental and post-test periods. However, without more 
consistent significant findings, determinations as to the effectiveness of this policing method 
are inconclusive based on this analysis. 
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Table 7. Mean Crime by Category and Wave Assignment 
  
                                      
  PRE-TEST  EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD  POST-TEST   
      
Treatment 
Mean 
Control 
Mean 
       
Treatment 
Mean 
Control 
Mean 
       
Treatment 
Mean 
Control 
Mean 
    
   Wave 
crime 
type t-value   Wave 
crime 
type t-value   Wave 
crime 
type t-value   
  1 Violent 6.78 6.13 0.26  1 Violent 0.00 0.00 1.97*  1 Violent 0.00 0.00 -0.62   
   Property 21.62 13.56 1.37   Property 0.00 0.00 1.86*   Property 0.00 0.00 2.60**   
   
Non-
ACTION 24.85 17.11 1.23   
Non-
ACTION 0.00 0.00 2.73**   
Non-
ACTION 0.00 0.00 2.12**   
  2 Violent 13.43 10.89 0.28  2 Violent 0.00 0.00 0.62  2 Violent 0.00 0.00 -0.34   
   Property 12.71 18.52 -0.79   Property 0.00 0.00 -2.02**   Property 0.00 0.00 -1.15   
   
Non-
ACTION 32.68 54.83 -0.68   
Non-
ACTION 0.00 0.00 -1.97*   
Non-
ACTION 0.00 0.00 -2.24**   
  3 Violent 6.13 3.87 1.26  3 Violent 0.00 0.00 -0.36  3 Violent 0.00 0.00 0.87   
   Property 18.07 21.62 -0.48   Property 0.00 0.00 -1.67   Property 0.00 0.00 -0.31   
   
Non-
ACTION 26.14 17.43 0.89   
Non-
ACTION 0.00 0.00 -0.32   
Non-
ACTION 0.00 0.00 -0.68   
  4 Violent 3.55 4.20 -0.21  4 Violent 0.00 0.00 -1.43  4 Violent 0.00 0.00 -0.65   
    Property 10.97 10.97 0.00   Property 0.00 0.00 -0.37    Property 0.00 0.00 1.06   
    
Non-
ACTION 15.17 11.94 0.34    
Non-
ACTION 0.00 0.00 -0.77    
Non-
ACTION 0.00 0.00 -0.52   
  
*<.10, **<.05 
                                  
 
  
 32 
 
The twelve pairs of experimental and control groups were also examined separately, so 
as to uncover any possible findings obscured by simply reporting on the means by waves. As 
seen in Table 8, a few pairs showed significant differences between experimental and control 
groups. During the experimental period, Pairs 1, 6, and 10 had significantly lower incidents of 
crime in the treatment areas. Furthermore, treatments areas in Pairs 1 and 10 continued to 
experience considerably less crime during the post-test. Pairs 1 and 10 are comprised of Areas 
5, 16, 17 and 12, which were all assigned to Wave 2. The significant results in Wave 2’s 
experimental and post-test periods shown in Tables 6 and 7 correspond accordingly to these 
findings. This shows the effectiveness of the Saturation Team at least while they were present 
in these particular areas. Pair 6, comprised of Areas 10 and 22, was assigned to Wave 3, which 
did not show similar significant results when analyses were run for all areas assigned to the 
wave. However, not all pairs showed similar promising results. 
  Pairs 3, 5, and 8 experienced significantly more crime in the treatment areas during the 
experimental period. These three pairs include all of the areas assigned to Wave 1, which 
produced similar, discouraging results in Tables 6 and 7. Only Pair 3 continued to experience 
significantly more crime in the post-test period as well. Treatment areas in Pairs 5 and 8 still 
experienced more crime in the post-test, but to a lesser extent. In contrast, Pair 9’s treatment 
area had significantly more crime in the post-test, but had a smaller increase during the 
experimental period. The significant difference between the treatment and control areas in the 
post-test for Pairs 3 and 9 could be the result of a decay effect, or a rebounding of crime after 
the Saturation Team left the areas, as previously mentioned. Interestingly, Pair 9 consists of 
areas 1 and 15, which were assigned to Wave 3. This wave did not produce significant findings 
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in Tables 6 or 7. Clearly, the grouping of the areas by wave did mask the significant finding for 
this pair.  
 
Table 8. Mean Crime by Week Per Matched Pair in the Experimental and Post-Test Periods 
          
    Experimental Period Post-test   
  Pair 1 12.37 (19.26)** 13.45 (21.41)**   
  Pair 2 4.52 (5.27) 4.84 (6.46)   
  Pair 3 9.53 (5.85)** 9.36 (6.46)**   
  Pair 4 6.94 (7.76) 5.92 (5.49)   
  Pair 5 8.58 (5.58)* 6.67 (5.59)   
  Pair 6 3.12 (7.32)** 4.08 (8.17)   
  Pair 7 7.21 (7.1) 8.17 (6.81)   
  Pair 8 5.85 (2.86)** 5.06 (3.01)   
  Pair 9 4.3 (3.34) 4.49 (2.72)*   
  Pair 10 1.51 (3.98)** 1.94 (4.09)**   
  Pair 11 2.72 (3.68) 2.37 (2.04)   
  Pair 12 0.41 (1.23) 0.22 (0.65)   
  *<.10, **<.05    
  experimental area mean (control area mean) 
 
Of note, the mean crimes in Table 8 range from 0.22 in Pair 12’s treatment post-test to 
21.41 in Pair 1’s control post-test. This wide disparity in crime incidents is possibly due to the 
differing spatial areas of the hot spot spots. In light of this, analyses were also conducted to 
control for the various sizes of the hot spots.  
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Part 2: Controlling for Square Mileage 
Figure 2. Hot Spot Area Boundaries 
 
 
Table 9. Square Mileage of Hot Spots by Matched Pairs 
                         
 Pair 
(areas) 
Pair 1 
(5,16) 
Pair 2 
(4,18) 
Pair 3  
(8,3) 
Pair 4  
(2,9) 
Pair 5 
(20,7) 
Pair 6 
(10,22)   
 sq. 
mileage 0.42 0.39 0.4 0.34 1.16 0.22 0.28 0.76 0.49 0.52 0.85 0.38   
                 
 
  
Pair 7 
(11,6) 
Pair 8 
(21,13) 
Pair 9 
(15,1) 
Pair 10 
(17,12) 
Pair 11 
(23,19) 
Pair 12 
(24,14)   
   0.52 0.42 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.42 0.11 0.8 0.37 0.27 0.06 0.08   
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Table 9 describes the square mileage for each hot spot area. The mean is 0.45 square 
miles for all areas, with a range of 0.06 square miles in Area 24 to 1.16 square miles in Area 8. 
Due to the various size differences, previous analyses were also conducted controlling for 
square mileage. 
 
Table 10. Mean Crime Per Square Mile During 36-week Experimental Period 
crime Experimental Control t-value 
Violent 60.54 67.48 -0.99 
Property 166.62 207.12 -3.21** 
Non-ACTION 231.37 301.12 -3.18** 
Overall 458.53 575.72 -3.72** 
*<.10, **<.05    
 
The standardized crime incidents in each area were divided by the areas’ respective 
square mileage to compute a rate of crime incidents per square mile. As seen in Table 3 
previously, the treatment and control groups were compared based on crimes during the entire 
36-week period in which the Saturation Team was operating during the experiment. After 
controlling for square mileage, results in Table 10 reveal significantly less property and Non-
ACTION crimes in the treatment areas. Before introducing the control, no significant differences 
were found.  
 
Table 11. Mean Crime Per Square Mile in Experimental and Control Areas 
  
Experimental 
Area Mean 
Control 
Area Mean t-value 
Pretest 114.86 124.61 -0.67 
Experimental Period 111.33 140.20 -1.95* 
Posttest 113.12 126.19 -1.69* 
*<.10, **<.05 
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 Again, after controlling for square mileage, the results show significantly less crime in 
the treatment areas during the experimental period and post-test, as seen in Table 11. Before 
controlling for square mileage, there were no significant differences between the areas during 
the three time periods (see Table 4). This finding possibly supports the crime deterrent effect of 
the Saturation Team within hot spots while they are present in the areas, and for a period of 
time after their enforcement has concluded. Further testing revealed similar results. 
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Table 12. Weekly Mean Crime Per Square Mile by Wave Assignment 
                                        
  PRE-TEST EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD POST-TEST    
      Treatment 
mean 
  Control 
mean 
      Treatment 
mean 
  Control 
mean 
      Treatment 
mean 
  Control 
mean 
    
   Wave Area Area t-value  Wave Area Area t-value  Wave Area Area t-value   
  1 8 5.66 3 15.16   1 8 8.22 3 26.61   1 8 8.07 3 29.34     
   20 14.71 7 10.97    20 17.51 7 10.74    20 13.61 7 10.76     
   21 8.29 13 6.33    21 12.20 13 5.61    21 10.53 13 5.91     
   SUM 28.66 SUM 32.45 -0.80  SUM 37.92 SUM 42.96 -0.61  SUM 32.22 SUM 46.01 -1.87*   
  2 5 30.15 16 52.72   2 5 29.46 16 49.38   2 5 32.02 16 54.90     
   4 17.36 18 21.63    4 17.31 18 15.50    4 12.10 18 18.99     
   17 22.28 12 4.60    17 13.69 12 4.98    17 17.60 12 5.11     
   SUM 69.79 SUM 78.94 -0.60  SUM 60.46 SUM 69.86 -1.15  SUM 61.73 SUM 78.99 -1.14   
  3 10 4.68 22 18.69   3 10 3.67 22 19.25   3 10 4.81 22 21.50     
   11 16.76 6 16.91    11 13.86 6 16.91    11 15.71 6 16.21     
   15 7.71 1 6.40    15 8.12 1 7.94    15 8.48 1 6.48     
   SUM 29.15 SUM 42.00 -1.29  SUM 25.65 SUM 44.10 -2.98**  SUM 28.99 SUM 44.19 -1.99*   
  4 2 20.75 9 7.36   4 2 24.80 9 10.21   4 2 21.13 9 7.22     
    23 10.76 19 9.56     23 7.36 19 13.62     23 6.40 19 7.57     
    24 1.79 14 10.76     24 6.81 14 15.32        24 3.59 14 8.07     
    SUM 33.30 SUM 27.68 0.77   SUM 38.97 SUM 39.15 -0.02   SUM 31.12 SUM 22.86 1.14   
  *<.10, **<.05                                   
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Table 12 reveals significant differences for treatment and control areas during some of 
the four waves after controlling for square mileage. As shown in Table 12, Wave 3 had 
significantly lower incidents of crime in the treatment areas during the experimental period and 
post-test after controlling for square mileage. However, before the control was introduced, 
Wave 1 saw significantly more crime and Wave 2 saw significantly less crime during the 
experiment. These inconsistent findings, shown previously in Table 6, are negated after 
controlling for area size. During the post-test period, Waves 1 and 3 experienced significantly 
less crime in the treatment areas with the control added, whereas before, only Wave 2 had 
seen materially less crime. Overall, the results for the post-test period, after controlling for 
square mileage, appear more aligned with the goals of the Saturation Team deployment, 
showing a decrease in crime rather than the contrary findings present before introducing the 
control. Across three-quarters of the waves, the areas receiving the Saturation Team 
enforcement saw a lesser extent of crime even after the heightened patrol was no longer 
present. This finding is closer to disaffirming concern over a decay effect and illustrates 
potential for the long-term effectiveness of increased enforcement on crime deterrence within 
hot spots.  
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Table 13. Weekly Mean Crime Per Square Mile by Matched Pair in the Experimental and Post-
Test Periods 
          
    Experimental Post-test   
  Pair 1 29.46 (49.38)** 32.02 (54.9)**   
  Pair 2 11.3 (15.5) 12.1 (18.99)*   
  Pair 3 8.22 (26.61)** 8.07 (29.34)**   
  Pair 4 24.8 (10.21)** 21.13 (7.22)**   
  Pair 5 17.51 (10.74)* 13.61 (10.76)   
  Pair 6 3.67 (19.25)** 4.81 (21.5)**   
  Pair 7 13.86 (16.91) 15.71 (16.21)   
  Pair 8 12.2 (5.61)** 10.53 (5.91)*   
  Pair 9 8.12 (7.94) 8.48 (6.48)   
  Pair 10 13.69 (4.98)** 17.6 (5.11)**   
  Pair 11 7.36 (13.62)* 6.4 (7.57)   
  Pair 12 6.81 (15.32) 3.59 (8.07)   
  *<.10, **<.05    
  experimental area mean (control area mean) 
 
However, examination of the matched pairs during the experimental and post-test 
periods produced some inconsistent results after controlling for square mileage. Table 13 
shows significantly less crime during the experimental period for treatment areas in Pairs 1, 3, 
6, and 11. For Pairs 1, 3, and 6, this finding continued into the post-test period, joined by the 
treatment area in Pair 2. Controlling for square mileage eliminated and even reversed the 
significant finding of less crime in Pair 10’s experimental area during the operation of the 
Saturation Team, but revealed significantly less crime in Pair 11’s experimental area relative to 
its control area, which had not previously been apparent. However, treatment areas in Pairs 4, 
5, 8, and 10 experienced opposite findings, with more crime during the experimental period. 
For Pairs 4, 8, and 10, this finding continued into the post-test period. With four treatment 
areas experiencing lower crime in both the experimental and post-test periods, and four and 
three areas experiencing higher crime during the experimental and post-test periods, 
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respectively, these results are too inconsistent to draw conclusions. However, as previously 
shown in Table 12, when combined into waves, the findings are more congruent and show 
some support for the use of the Saturation Team. 
Part 3: Within Group Comparisons 
A final set of analyses were run to compare crime across the pre-test, experimental, and 
post-test periods based on assignment to treatment or control. Table 14 begins by showing 
results similar to those previously shown in Table 4, with no notable differences in mean crime 
between the pre-test, experimental, and post-test periods for treatment and control areas. 
Next, crimes were categorized between violent, property and non-ACTION, which still revealed 
no notable differences in the treatment areas (see Table 15). The only significant difference was 
an increase in property crime from the pre-test to the experimental period in the control areas. 
Property crimes also rose in the treatment areas across this timeframe, but to a lesser extent. 
 
Table 14. Mean Crime Compared by Experimental or Control Designation 
  Pre-test 
Experimental 
Period t-value1 Post-test t-value2 
Experimental 
Area Mean 48.03 47.46 -0.17 48.52 0.06 
Control Area 
Mean 47.77 52.67 -1.04 53.19 0.15 
      1 pre-test vs. experimental period t-value 
          2 experimental period vs. post-test t-value 
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Table 15. Mean Crime by Category Compared by Experimental or Control Designation 
  
Pre-test 
Experimental 
Period t-value1 Post-test t-value2 
Violent 
Experimental Area 
Mean 7.47 6.43 -0.64 6.32 0.24 
Control Area Mean 6.27 5.74 0.31 6.75 -0.74 
  Property 
Experimental Area 
Mean 15.85 18.02 -1.27 19.95 -0.57 
Control Area Mean 16.17 20.49 -2.25** 17.97 1.38 
  Non-ACTION 
Experimental Area 
Mean 24.71 23.01 0.33 22.25 0.47 
Control Area Mean 25.33 26.44 -0.43 28.47 -0.26 
        1 pre-test vs. experimental period t-value 
                 2 experimental period vs. post-test t-value 
 
  
Table 16 presents a comparison of crime during the pre-test, experimental and post-test 
periods for experimental and control areas by wave assignment. During Wave 1, experimental 
areas saw a significant increase in crime during the experimental period compared to the pre-
test period. The increase was not sustained into the post-test period. The increase seen in 
Wave 1 could be due to the Saturation Team generating more crime reports due to their 
increased patrol in the area.  
 Significant increases in crime are seen in the control areas during the post-test 
compared to the experimental period in Wave 4. Similar increases were not seen in the 
experimental areas during these same times. It is possible the efforts of the Saturation Team 
during Wave 4 effectively served to prevent similar rises in crime in the experimental areas.  
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Table 16. Mean Crime by Wave Compared Across Time Periods in Experimental and Control 
Areas 
EXPERIMENTAL AREAS  CONTROL AREAS 
   Pre-
test 
Exp. 
Period t-value1 
Post-
test t-value2 
    Pre-
test 
Exp. 
Period 
 Post-
test t-value2   Area    Area t-value1 
Wave 1 8 6.56 9.53   9.36    Wave 1 3 3.34 5.85  6.46   
  20 7.21 8.58  6.67      7 5.70 5.58  5.59   
  21 3.98 5.85  5.06      13 3.23 2.86  3.01   
  SUM 17.75 23.96 -2.29** 21.09 1.00    SUM 12.26 14.30 -1.01 15.06 -0.36 
Wave 2 5 12.66 12.37  13.45    Wave 2 16 20.56 19.26  21.41   
  4 6.94 4.52  4.84      18 7.35 5.27  6.46   
  17 2.45 1.51  1.94      12 3.68 3.98  4.09   
  SUM 22.06 18.40 0.85 20.23 -0.41    SUM 31.59 28.51 0.47 31.95 -0.53 
Wave 3 10 3.98 3.12  4.08    Wave 3 22 7.10 7.32  8.17   
  11 8.71 7.21  8.17      6 4.52 7.10  6.81   
  15 4.09 4.30  4.49      1 2.69 3.34  2.72   
  SUM 16.78 14.63 0.83 16.75 -0.77    SUM 14.31 17.75 -1.46 17.70 0.02 
Wave 4 2 5.81 6.94  5.92    Wave 4 9 5.59 7.76  5.49   
  23 3.98 2.72  2.37      19 2.58 3.68  2.04   
  24 0.11 0.41  0.22      14 0.86 1.23  0.65   
  SUM 9.90 10.08 -0.07 8.50 0.59    SUM 9.04 12.66 -1.39 8.18 1.74* 
1 pre-test vs. experimental period t-value 
2 experimental period vs. post-test t-value 
 
  
 Table 17 compares the crime in the treatment areas during the time the Saturation 
Team was present versus the time the Saturation Team was not present, but was still operating 
in other areas for the experiment. This data includes the mean crime incidents during the 9-
week deployment and the mean during the 27-weeks the Saturation Team operated in other 
hot spots. Half of the areas experienced higher crime during the Saturation Team 9-week 
deployment, and half experienced less crime. However, only two areas saw a significant 
difference. A t-test revealed Area 2 experienced significantly higher crime while the Saturation 
Team was present, while Area 4 experienced significantly less crime while the Saturation Team 
was present. Once again, the results are inconclusive. 
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Table 17. Experimental Areas Mean Crime During Saturation Team Enforcement and Without 
Enforcement 
MEAN CRIME BY WEEK IN TX AREAS 
AREA 
SAT TEAM 
PRESENT 
(9 weeks) 
SAT TEAM 
NOT PRESENT 
(27 weeks) t-value 
2 6.94 4.41 2.65** 
4 4.52 6.19 -1.84* 
5 12.37 14.43 -1.20 
8 9.53 8.62 0.66 
10 3.12 4.48 -1.45 
11 7.21 9.19 -1.43 
15 4.30 4.13 0.21 
17 1.51 2.09 -0.98 
20 8.58 7.54 0.88 
21 5.85 4.96 0.78 
23 2.72 3.64 -1.38 
24 0.41 0.35 0.23 
*<.10, **<.05 
   
 
 The original study conducted by Baldwin et al. (2014) identified a different, more 
consistent finding when the researchers analyzed mean calls for service for disorderly offenses 
in the 9-week on and 27-week off period of saturation enforcement. In their study, four areas 
experienced significantly higher crime during the 9-week period the Saturation Team was 
present. No other areas reached levels of significance, although a total of eight of the twelve 
areas saw higher disorder offenses during the enforcement period. As the researchers explain, 
this result is possibly due to an increase of citizens’ willingness to report crime after noticing the 
increased police presence. As the citizens see the officers in their area, they may feel as though 
the police are more likely to respond to their calls. Since the non-ACTION crime category in this 
thesis was selected largely to reflect disorderly offenses, and since it represents the greatest 
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category of crime (see Table 2), the previous t-test was reanalyzed solely with non-ACTION 
crimes.  
 In an attempt to recreate the Baldwin et al. (2014) findings for increased disorder 
offenses during the 9-week saturation enforcement period, a t-test was completed to compare 
crime reports for non-ACTION crime during the enforcement to the 27-weeks without 
enforcement. Results in Table 18 show a lack of similar findings. Opposite from the Baldwin et 
al. (2014) findings, only four areas saw higher non-ACTION crime reports during the saturation 
patrol’s enforcement period, and none of these areas rose to levels of statistical significance. 
Area 45 experienced the only significant difference between the two time periods, but saw 
significantly less crime during the saturation enforcement. In the Las Vegas Smart Policing 
Initiative, this same area did not show a significant difference. 
 This lack of consistent findings between the two studies could be due to the 
dissimilarities between the non-ACTION crime category used in this thesis, and the disorderly 
offenses used in the Las Vegas Smart Policing Initiative. Another possible explanation for the 
inconsistent results is due to the different measures of crime, calls for service versus crime 
report data, utilized in the studies. The following section delves into a deeper comparison of 
the differing results shown with the two measures of crimes and explains reasons for these 
disparities. 
  
                                                          
5 The areas in the Baldwin et al. (2014) study and the present thesis are not numbered consistently. See Appendix 
for the area numbers used in this thesis and the corresponding area numbers used in the Las Vegas Smart Policing 
Initiative report.  
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Table 18. Experimental Areas Mean Non-ACTION Crime During Saturation Team Enforcement 
and Without Enforcement 
MEAN NON-ACTION CRIME BY WEEK IN TX AREAS 
AREA 
SAT TEAM 
PRESENT 
(9 weeks) 
SAT TEAM NOT 
PRESENT 
(27 weeks) t-value 
2 3.00 2.09 1.53 
4 2.15 3.11 -1.76* 
5 7.64 8.58 -0.83 
8 4.90 4.05 0.96 
10 1.40 2.14 -1.17 
11 3.87 4.58 -0.76 
15 1.40 1.99 -0.98 
17 0.54 1.29 -1.62 
20 3.13 2.65 0.73 
21 2.72 2.62 0.15 
23 1.50 1.92 -0.90 
24 0.14 0.16 -0.17 
    
 
Calls for Service vs. Crime Report Data 
 The original Las Vegas Smart Policing Initiative report conducted by Baldwin et al. (2014) 
relied on calls for service data as a measure of crime. In completing this thesis, one intent was 
to highlight any possible differences between calls for service as a measure of crime and crime 
report data as a measure of crime. As previously mentioned, calls for service data has the 
advantage of being free from police discretion, whereas officers can choose whether or not to 
generate a crime report for certain events. On the other hand, crime report data has the 
advantage of eliminating duplicate calls for a single event, thereby providing a more accurate 
count, categorizing the crime correctly, and representing more crime than just those events 
called in through police dispatch. However, both crime measures are limited by citizens’ 
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willingness to report criminal activity. In light of these differences, findings from the original Las 
Vegas Smart Policing Initiative report are compared to the findings presented above. 
 Unfortunately, the formatting of the data between the two studies does not allow for a 
straight comparison. For instance, the categorization of crimes differs between weapons, 
disorder, Compstat, person stops, and vehicle stops in the Baldwin et al. study, to violent, 
property and non-ACTION crimes in the present thesis. However, since the classification of a 
crime in a call for service does not directly correlate to the classification of a crime report, due 
to erroneous citizen reporting, etc., a close approximation of the crime categories across the 
two measures is sufficient.  
 One of the notable findings presented by Baldwin et al. (2014) shows materially higher 
weapons related calls for service in the experimental areas versus the control areas6. A similar 
finding is shown in Table 6 previously where violent offenses were higher in the experimental 
areas while the Saturation Team was present in Wave 1. However, once Baldwin et al. 
narrowed their analysis down to include only data during the time the Saturation Team was 
present, instead of the entire time of the experiment, the finding was invalidated. Disorder 
offenses did not appear significantly different in Baldwin et al.’s analysis, however non-ACTION 
crimes, largely similar to disorder offenses, experienced significant differences between the 
treatment and control groups during Wave 1 and Wave 2’s experimental and post-test periods 
in the current study. This shows crime report data did reveal an effect of the Saturation Team 
that calls for service failed to identify.   
                                                          
6 See Table 15 in Baldwin et al. (2014) 
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As summarized in the original report, “analyses of calls for service suggested few 
differences between the treatment and control areas” (Baldwin, et al., 2014, p. 52). For the 
most part, current analyses of crime report data did not reveal any consistent, significant 
differences between the treatment and control areas. Results were generally inconclusive, 
showing some treatment areas experiencing higher crime and some experiencing lower crime. 
After controlling for the size of the hot spots, significant results in favor of the use of the 
Saturation Team began to emerge. However, these findings were still not adequate to fully 
support saturation enforcement across all waves.  It is possible more conclusive findings may 
have may identified in the original report had the researchers utilized the same method of 
controlling for square mileage.  
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Chapter 6: Summary 
The analyses contained in this thesis present some indications as to the effectiveness of 
the use of saturation patrol within hot spots. After controlling for the size of the hot spot areas, 
results appeared slightly more consistent and more conclusive than previous tests. Most 
notably, when examined overall, the treatment areas experienced significantly less crime 
during the experimental and post-test periods after controlling for square mileage. Further, 
when crime incidents were converted to crime incidents per square mile, analysis revealed 
lower crime in treatment areas across three of the four waves during the post-test period. 
However, only two of the waves showed significantly less crime during this time period. While 
these findings point to a possibly lasting crime deterrent effect of saturation patrol within the 
hot spots areas, mixed results across the waves make evidence in support of police saturation 
inconclusive.  
Interestingly, Jang, Lee, and Hoover (2012) did not identify a similar residual effect in 
their study of saturation patrol within hot spots in Dallas, Texas. However, their study examined 
data from entire sectors rather than solely the hot spots, which could have impacted their 
findings. As they mention, the residual effect on crime is important due to the limited nature of 
police resources (Jang, Lee, & Hoover, 2012). Police cannot deploy units to every location all the 
time, and therefore must rely on tactics that have the best residual deterrent effect. The 
reductions in crime during the 9-week post-test period for three of the four waves indicates 
promise for the use of saturation patrol to reduce crime and do so in a cost-effect manner.  
However, other tests which did not control for mileage presented indeterminate 
findings. Examination of the mean crime in the treatment versus control areas revealed no 
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significant differences during the pre-test, experimental and post-test periods, even when 
broken down by crime category. Further, after conducting an analysis by wave, two waves 
presented significant differences, but in opposite directions. One wave experienced remarkably 
higher crime during the experimental and post-test periods and one wave experienced 
remarkably lower crime during the experimental and post-test periods. These conflicting results 
do not lend well to developing sound policy regarding successful police tactics to utilize within 
hot spots. Several theories explain the possible reasons behind the increased crime within the 
hot spots during and after the saturation patrol enforcement. 
 As Baldwin et al. (2014) mention in response to certain types of calls for service 
increasing during saturation deployment in their study, the heightened police presence in hot 
spots may actually have caused a backfire effect. Weisburd, et al. (2011) explain elevated police 
presence may cause citizens within hot spots to believe crime has increased. This in turn 
creates fear, which can give way to disorder or more serious offenses, as contended in the 
Broken Windows hypothesis. Additionally, the heavy police response can cause a breakdown in 
communities’ collective efficacy. Once these social controls are eroded, communities lack to 
ability to put in check their own problems, and instead rely on outside forces, such as the 
police, for resolutions. These can all manifest in increased calls to police and crime reporting.  
 Another possible explanation for some of the inconsistent findings may be due to the 
relatively short-term interventions utilized in the experiment. The Saturation Team was 
responsible for patrolling three hot spots within each 61-day period. Taylor, Koper, and Woods 
(2011) failed to identify statistically significant reductions in crime after a 90-day police 
saturation. However, they note the residual effect of the saturation efforts may have been 
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greater with a longer implementation period. The present thesis examined an even shorter 
implementation period, which may also have shown different results had the Saturation Team 
operated within the hot spots for a longer period of time.  
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Chapter 7: Limitations 
 The limitations of the current study could explain some of the varied results seen in the 
previous analyses. First, while controlling for square mileage was possible, it would have been 
beneficial to control for population size within hot spots as well. If one hot spot had a 
significantly larger population than the others, it would explain a possible increased occurrence 
of crime in the area. Calculation of the crime rate in this manner was not possible as population 
data by area was not available. Therefore, the study relied on crime occurrences. As seen with 
controlling for square mileage, introducing this control may have presented altered findings.   
 Second, officers’ knowledge of which areas were involved in the experiment may 
present a limitation. Officers naturally were aware of which areas were receiving treatment 
since the Saturation Team was being assigned to those areas. This may have caused other 
officers to avoid the areas in which the Saturation Team was conducting enforcement, as there 
was already a police presence. However, if the officers from the area commands, or other 
specialized units would have normally patrolled the areas if the Saturation Team was not 
present, this could serve to limit the study as the introduction of the Saturation Team was not 
the only variable that changed. This is supported by findings presented in the Baldwin et al. 
(2014) study.  The researchers noted mean self-initiated activity by officers was lower in 
experimental groups, which they posit may be due to area command and traffic officers’ lack of 
activity in the areas in response to the Saturation Team’s operations.  
 Third, despite officers’ knowledge of the hot spot areas, it is possible their activities 
stretched outside the boundaries, particularly in some of the smaller areas. Since the data 
utilized is limited to occurrences within the boundaries, any efforts outside the boundaries, 
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however slight, would not be captured. For instance, if Saturation Team officers took a report 
for a crime that occurred across the street from a hot spot, this would not be counted and 
included with the data in this study. Any activity outside the hot spots would detract from their 
officers’ ability to conduct enforcement within the area, thus the impact of the saturation 
would be lacking by that degree.  
 Fourth, if the spillover of saturation patrol activities occurred in a control group area, 
this may have caused contamination. As Figure 1 shows, a number of control areas in the 
experiment were adjacent to treatment areas. If, as described previously, the Saturation Team 
operated outside of the treatment hot spot boundaries and within the boundaries of the 
control group, this would impact the data and confound the results.  
 Fifth and finally, even if officers were operating within the hot spot areas, the process of 
geocoding crime occurrences within geographic information systems is imperfect, and may 
confound results by assigning crimes to different areas from which they occurred. As noted by 
Ratcliffe (2004), the geocoding process is an imperfect one, and even a small number of 
geocoding errors may significantly alter data. Because this study relied on geocoded crime 
occurrences, it is possible some crimes were not captured, as they were erroneously plotted 
outside the hot spots, or some crimes were erroneously captured, as they were plotted within 
the hot spot areas.  
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Chapter 8: Policy Implications 
While the efficacy of the Saturation Team is not significantly apparent throughout all of 
the analyses conducted, there is still value to this type of patrol. As evidenced when controlling 
for square mileage, a majority of the waves experienced overall less crime in the treatment 
areas during the post-test compared to the control areas, with half of the areas seeing 
significantly less. This finding shows promise for the effectiveness of saturation patrol and 
importantly, the long-term deterrent impact of the Saturation Team’s operations within hot 
spots.  
As Taylor, Koper, and Woods (2011) note, shorter interventions are more susceptible to 
a decay effect after conclusion of the enforcement. While the post-test period after controlling 
for square mileage revealed little evidence to support the decay effect, it is possible a longer 
intervention period could have produced an even greater deterrent effect. However, a longer 
intervention period would require more resources and thus be costlier. The significant 
differences in crime between treatment and control groups even just for a period of 61-days 
supports the use of saturation patrol within hot spots without a necessarily large commitment 
of resources. 
Further, assigning officers to these crime-troubled areas enables officers to work more 
closely with the community and build trust and a working relationship. As Weisburd, et al. 
(2011) note, for police to have a long-term impact on crime they must exhibit legitimacy, build 
collective efficacy, and reduce fear. A backfire effect, as possibly evidenced in the original 
report, is possible if saturation officers ignore these objectives. Therefore, officers in hot spots 
should undertake a more proactive role and allow for greater, more nuanced problem-solving 
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respective to the issues these communities face.  With these goals in mind, saturation patrol 
may have a positive impact on crime within hot spots.  
Lastly, when reviewing the results of the analyses it is important to remember any crime 
reduction is important to potential victims and the community. Social science stresses the 
importance of statistical significance, but police departments may view crime reductions that 
do not rise to this standard as still valuable and impactful. If police efforts cause a marked 
decrease in crime, and they are able to improve community relations, the policing tactic would 
be successful from a departmental standpoint.  
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Appendix 
Table 19. Hot Spot Area Numbers in Current Thesis and Corresponding Area Numbers from 
Baldwin et al. (2014) Study with 2011 Calls for Service (CFS) Totals 
 
Current 
Thesis 
Baldwin et 
al., 2014 
2011 CFS 
Totals 
1 17 891 
2 7 1427 
3 5 1581 
4 4 1812 
5 2 3135 
6 14 1157 
7 9 1353 
8 6 1519 
9 8 1355 
10 11 1316 
11 13 1201 
12 19 673 
13 15 1145 
14 23 362 
15 18 818 
16 1 4394 
17 20 670 
18 3 1846 
19 22 501 
20 10 1353 
21 16 1084 
22 12 1283 
23 21 620 
24 24 141 
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